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Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue
Burden Preemption
Caitlin E. Borgmann∗
Abstract
This Article discusses the tendency of some lower federal
courts to interpret the undue burden standard of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey as essentially
occupying the field of potential constitutional claims whenever
abortion is involved. Thus, where litigants have alleged
constitutional claims other than, or in addition to, undue burden
violations, courts have either changed how they normally analyze
these constitutional claims or they have even completely foreclosed
the application of other doctrines on the grounds that the undue
burden standard subsumes or displaces these claims. This Article
illustrates this phenomenon in the context of three types of nonundue-burden claims that have been asserted against some
abortion restrictions: bodily integrity, equal protection, and the
right against compelled speech. Undue burden preemption, I
argue, flies in the face of the Court’s recognition that “[c]ertain
wrongs . . . can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s
commands.”1 Where multiple constitutional violations are alleged,
the Court’s normal approach is to examine each constitutional
provision in turn. There is one well-established exception to this
general rule, the “Graham doctrine.” This doctrine provides that,
when a litigant asserts a substantive due process claim, and where
the Court finds that another more specific constitutional provision
applies, the Court analyzes the claim under the more specific
provision to the exclusion of substantive due process. This Article
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1. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992).
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argues that undue burden preemption, far from being justified by
the Graham doctrine, turns that doctrine on its head.
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I. Introduction
“Abortion exceptionalism” is a term that has been used to
describe the tendency of legislatures and courts to subject
abortion to unique, and uniquely burdensome, rules.2 This Article
addresses a particular kind of abortion exceptionalism, which I
call “undue burden preemption.” Undue burden preemption is a
trend in which some lower federal courts interpret the undue
burden standard as essentially occupying the field of potential
constitutional claims that may be brought against a given
abortion restriction.3 Under undue burden preemption, courts
2. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortion, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1175, 1177 (2014) (describing abortion exceptionalism as courts’ failure to
apply “normal doctrine” when abortion is at issue); Ian Vandelwalker, Abortion
and Informed Consent, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2012) (describing abortion
exceptionalism as singling “abortion . . . out for more restrictive government
regulation as compared to other, similar procedures”). Abortion rights opponents
have used the term in the opposite sense, to suggest that courts have unfairly
privileged abortion over competing constitutional rights. See “Abortion
Exceptionalism” to be Reviewed by U.S. Supreme Court, LIFE LEGAL DEF. FOUND.
(Sept. 12, 2013), http://lldf.org/abortion-exceptionalism-to-be-reviewed-by-u-ssupreme-court/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (describing abortion exceptionalism
as “the idea that abortion clinics somehow deserve special treatment in the free
speech context”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See infra Part III (discussing examples of undue burden preemption).
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addressing the constitutionality of abortion restrictions either
refuse to analyze claims other than undue burden claims on the
grounds that the undue burden standard displaces the other
claims, or they interpret the undue burden standard as
supplanting or altering the normal doctrine applied to the
separate claims.4 Undue burden preemption is an aberration in
constitutional adjudication. Normally, when a litigant alleges
that a particular governmental action violates multiple
constitutional rights, the courts analyze each alleged violation
separately under the relevant doctrine.5
The only area in which the United States Supreme Court has
allowed a particular constitutional claim to “preempt” another
separate claim is that of substantive due process. Under the
“Graham doctrine,” as it is known, when a litigant asserts a
substantive due process claim, and where the Court finds that
another more specific constitutional provision applies (for
instance, the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures), the Court analyzes the claim under the
more specific provision to the exclusion of substantive due
process.6 Undue burden preemption is the opposite of the
Graham doctrine. Whereas the Graham doctrine prefers a more
specific constitutional claim to a more general one, undue burden
preemption rejects, or waters down, more specific constitutional
claims (or, in the case of bodily integrity, an equally nonspecific
constitutional claim) in favor of the notoriously nonspecific undue
burden standard.7 Thus, under Graham, undue burden
preemption is still jurisprudentially indefensible.
This Article is organized into three parts. Part II describes
the prevailing approach to adjudicating constitutional claims,
along with the single established exception to this approach, the
Graham doctrine. Part III explains the concept of undue burden
preemption, illustrating its use in three doctrinal contexts: bodily
integrity, equal protection, and free speech. Part IV critiques
undue burden preemption as a misguided and dangerous
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part III (discussing the prevailing approach).
6. See infra notes 25–31 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine
established in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
7. See infra Part III (discussing undue burden preemption).

1050

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047 (2014)

expansion of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey’s8 undue burden standard, one that turns the Graham
doctrine on its head.

II. The Prevailing Approach
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a particular
governmental act can implicate more than one constitutional
right.9 When this is the case, claimants can assert multiple
constitutional claims, and courts will consider each in turn,
applying the relevant constitutional doctrine to each claim
separately.10 The Court has expressly acknowledged this
prevailing approach on more than one occasion. In United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Property,11 the Court addressed
whether the government’s seizure of the claimant’s property
without prior notice and a hearing violated procedural due
process.12 The Government argued that it need only comply with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.13 The Court agreed
that the Fourth Amendment applied to the seizure but declared
that this was not the “sole constitutional provision in question.”14
The Court explained: “We have rejected the view that the
applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the
guarantees of another.”15 The Court in Good Real Property relied
upon Soldal v. Cook County,16 a property seizure case in which
the Court had made the identical point.17 In Soldal, the Court

8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. See Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992) (“Certain wrongs affect
more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the
Constitution’s commands.”).
10. See id. (“Where . . . multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the
habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim’s ‘dominant’ character.
Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn.”).
11. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
12. Id. at 46.
13. Id. at 49.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 506 U.S. 56 (1992).
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stated: “Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and,
accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s
commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are
not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim’s
‘dominant’ character. Rather, we examine each constitutional
provision in turn.”18
The Court’s recognition of the prevailing approach in Good
Real Property and Soldal merely makes explicit what courts have
always done. Courts routinely address, seriatim, different
constitutional claims addressing the same governmental action.
They do not construe one applicable constitutional provision to
preempt another, nor do they force claimants to litigate solely
under the doctrine of the Court’s choice. In Doe v. Bolton,19 for
example, the Supreme Court considered claims that various
Georgia abortion restrictions violated not only the right to
privacy but also procedural due process, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and equal protection.20 The Ninth Circuit in a
recent case addressing a sex offender registration law separately
considered, and analyzed under the respective doctrines, claims
that the law violated the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto
Clauses; procedural due process; and the Contract Clause.21

17. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49–50
(1993) (relying on Soldal to support the fact that the Court “ha[s] rejected the
view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts the
guarantees of another”); see also Soldal, 506 U.S. at 60 (noting that the Court
“granted certiorari to consider whether the seizure and removal of the Soldals’
trailer home implicated their Fourth Amendment rights”).
18. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 60; see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 287
(1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court has previously
rejected the proposition that the Constitution’s application to a general
subject . . . is necessarily exhausted by protection under particular textual
guarantees addressing specific events within that subject . . . , on a theory that
one specific constitutional provision can pre-empt a broad field as against
another more general one.”).
19. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
20. See id. at 195–96, 200–01 (discussing whether appellant was deprived
of procedural due process as a result of lack of access to hospital despite being
pregnant and whether Georgia’s residency requirements violated the Privileges
and Immunities Clause or equal protection provisions of the U.S. Constitution).
21. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1052–61
(9th Cir. 2012).
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There is one well-established—if not exactly well-known22—
exception to this general rule. This exception applies when a
substantive due process claim is asserted. Under the exception,
the Court applies other constitutional provisions to the exclusion
of substantive due process where it finds that the other
provisions supply an “explicit textual source of constitutional
protection.”23 This exception is known as the “Graham doctrine,”
from one of the early cases to announce the doctrine, Graham v.
Connor.24 In Graham, the Court held that claims of excessive
force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop must be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, rather under than the
“more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process.’”25 While
Graham could be interpreted as applying only to excessive force
cases, or perhaps to the Fourth Amendment context more
generally,26 the Court has more recently applied the doctrine to
the Takings Clause27 and to the Eighth Amendment.28 It has
suggested in dicta that it applies to the Fifth Amendment Self22. Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot”
Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1088 (1998)
(describing the Graham doctrine as a “little known corner of due process law”).
23. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
24. 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see also id. at 395 (“[We] hold that all claims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . should be analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a
‘substantive due process’ approach.”); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27
(1975) (holding that “The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the
criminal justice system,” and therefore the Fourth Amendment, rather than the
Due Process Clause, is more appropriate for determining proceedings required
after criminal arrests).
25. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
26. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 273–75 (applying Graham doctrine to Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim).
27. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 721 (2010) (“The first problem with using Substantive Due Process
to do the work of the Takings Clause is that we have held it cannot be done.”).
But see Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A
Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1002–05 (2000) (discussing and criticizing the
application of the Graham doctrine in the context of property takings).
28. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“Graham
simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific
constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim
must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not
under the rubric of substantive due process.”).
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Incrimination Clause as well.29 Some lower federal courts have
interpreted Graham as establishing the general principle that
whenever another amendment provides “an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection,”30 that provision must be
applied to the exclusion of substantive due process.31
It is important to recognize that Graham—whatever its
scope—displaces substantive due process claims only, and then
only when an express textual provision is applicable. The
apparent underlying premise of the Graham doctrine is that
substantive due process is murky, lacks clear guideposts, and
addresses unenumerated rights.32 Therefore, if the Court has
explicit constitutional text to apply, it prefers to do so.33 The
29. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 n.5 (2003) (“If . . . the Fifth
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause governs coercive police interrogation
even absent use of compelled statements in a criminal case, then Graham
suggests that the Due Process Clause would not.”).
30. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
31. See, e.g., Holman v. Page, 95 F.3d 481, 485–86 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing
to apply a due process or equal protection standard to cases challenging the
proportionality of sentences because “[t]he Eighth Amendment explicitly
addresses the constitutionality of punishments”), overruled on other grounds by
Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2004); Armendariz v. Penman,
75 F.3d 1311, 1325–26 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that, “[s]ince Sinaloa, the
Supreme Court has made clear what was implicit in Graham,” that
“[s]ubstantive due process analysis has no place in contexts already addressed
by explicit textual provisions of constitutional protection, regardless of whether
the plaintiff’s potential claims under those amendments have merit”), overruled
in part by Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855–56
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding that “the Fifth Amendment would preclude a due
process challenge only if the alleged conduct is actually covered by [the
Amendment]” and “it is no longer possible . . . to read Armendariz as imposing a
blanket obstacle to all substantive due process challenges to land use
regulation”). The Supreme Court itself has not consistently applied Graham this
broadly, however. See Massaro, supra note 22, at 1108–09, 1113 n.132 (pointing
out that the Supreme Court has not extended the Graham doctrine to Takings
Clause cases or in some criminal procedure contexts).
32. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (“Because the Fourth Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort
of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing
these claims.”); Massaro, supra note 22, at 1115 (“The Court has since cited only
judicial authority concerns of vagueness, open-ended provisions, and the
absence of meaningful judicial standards in explaining Graham.”).
33. The Graham doctrine has been criticized on various grounds. See, e.g.,
Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed Bodily
Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 51–56)
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Graham doctrine does not foreclose the possibility that a wrong
could implicate multiple constitutional claims.34 Moreover,
nothing about the Graham doctrine suggests that courts should
interpret an unenumerated, substantive due process right—like
the right to privacy—as preempting either a textually grounded
constitutional claim35 or another unenumerated right.36
III. Undue Burden Preemption
Before the Supreme Court established a new standard for
evaluating abortion restrictions in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, such restrictions were
analyzed under strict scrutiny, pursuant to the framework set out
in Roe v. Wade.37 Casey changed the Roe framework in several
[hereinafter Borgmann, The Constitutionality] (arguing that the Graham
doctrine wrongly assumes that the Fourth Amendment offers doctrinally clearer
guideposts than substantive due process in the context of state-imposed bodily
intrusions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Seth F. Kreimer,
Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority Over the Body”: The Decencies of Civilized
Conduct, The Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
423, 436–37 (2007) (criticizing the Graham doctrine’s “confining [of] rights to
bodily integrity” to the Fourth Amendment as “somewhat mysterious and
largely ineffective”); Massaro, supra note 22, at 1115–16 (arguing that the
Graham doctrine, as broadly interpreted, amounts to an inadvisable adoption of
Hugo Black’s rejected “jot-for-jot” interpretation of the Due Process Clause).
34. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
49 (1993).
35. Cf. Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1535 n.8 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting
that, although under Graham and Albright the Fourth Amendment displaces
substantive due process claims concerning whether police acted with probable
cause, it does not displace separate claims brought under “the equally explicit
constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment and Equal Protection
Clause”), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d
905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001).
36. See, Massaro, supra note 22, at 1087 (“[The] trumping move [of the
Graham doctrine] displaces only one general provision: substantive due
process.”)
37. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–65 (1973) (providing that a state
must have a compelling interest in regulating abortion prior to the first
trimester, and that it may reasonably regulate abortion procedure after the first
trimester); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
61 (1976) (applying Roe’s strict scrutiny framework); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986) (same), overruled by
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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significant ways, which some lower courts have interpreted as
impelling the concept of undue burden preemption. First, the
Court recognized the state’s interest in the embryo or fetus as a
valid basis for abortion regulation throughout pregnancy,38 not
just after viability as Roe had held.39 Second, the Court lowered
the standard from strict scrutiny to the more nebulous undue
burden standard, which asks whether a law has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion.40
Since Casey, some lower courts seem to view the undue
burden standard as preempting nearly all other substantive
claims that might otherwise be brought against an abortion
restriction.41 The Fifth Circuit suggests that this is because Casey
struck a delicate balance between the woman’s rights and the
interest of the state in the embryo or fetus in the pre-viability
period of pregnancy, and it regards other substantive claims
attacking abortion restrictions as disturbing this equilibrium.42
The Fifth Circuit adheres to this view even when the separate
claims are asserting the rights of entirely different parties
(doctors, rather than patients, for example).43 Three particular
doctrines that different courts have found to be preempted by the
38. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(“[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child.”); see also Caitlin E.
Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and
Carhart, 31 FORD. URB. L.J. 675, 678–701 (2004) (discussing Casey’s changes to
the Roe framework).
39. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 463 (“With respect to the State’s important and
legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.”).
40. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (“In our view, the undue burden standard is
the appropriate means of reconciling the state’s interest with the woman’s
constitutionally protected liberty.”).
41. One exception to this is vagueness, which even courts that apply undue
burden preemption seem to agree is a doctrinally independent claim. See, e.g.,
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580–84
(5th Cir. 2013) (applying the void for vagueness doctrine as a standalone
inquiry); Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 503–06
(6th Cir. 2012) (same).
42. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing Tex. Med.
Providers Performing Abortion Servs.,667 F.3d at 576–77).
43. See infra notes 178–93 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth
Circuit’s application of the undue burden analysis in Lakey as occupying the
field of constitutional claims).
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undue burden standard are bodily integrity,44 equal protection,45
and compelled speech.46 Because the Casey joint opinion did not
analyze the abortion restrictions at issue there under bodily
integrity or the equal protection doctrine,47 it is difficult to argue
that undue burden preemption in these contexts is compelled by
Casey. Nevertheless some lower courts have, sua sponte,
concluded that the undue burden standard displaces or limits
these claims.48 Compelled speech, on the other hand, was
addressed in Casey, albeit briefly.49 Analyzing undue burden
preemption in the compelled speech context requires examining
Casey’s own confusing treatment of the compelled speech claim
there, as well as lower courts’ interpretations of Casey as
supporting undue burden preemption of compelled speech claims.
A. Bodily Integrity
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ treatment of a bodily
integrity claim against an abortion restriction offers perhaps the
most straightforward example of undue burden preemption. In
Planned Parenthood Southwestern Ohio Region v. DeWine,50 the
Sixth Circuit in effect applied undue burden preemption when it
upheld a state restriction on medication abortion.51 The Sixth
Circuit reasoned, in part, that bodily integrity claims, which
44. Infra Part III.A.
45. Infra Part III.B.
46. Infra Part III.C.
47. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844–47
(1992) (discussing the statutory provisions at issue and finding that the abortion
right is constitutionally protected under the framework of substantive due
process); cf. id. at 896 (noting that effect of Pennsylvania’s husband notification
provision “on a woman’s protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such
a case, as the State has touched not only upon the private sphere of the family
but upon the very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman”).
48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d
490, 506 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying the undue burden standard to a bodily
integrity claim).
49. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
50. 696 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2012).
51. See id. at 514, 518 (concluding that a statutory restriction on
medication abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an
undue burden on the ability to get an abortion).
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would normally be subject to strict scrutiny, should be analyzed
under Casey’s undue burden standard when asserted against
abortion requirements.52
In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had
approved the drug mifepristone—also known as RU-486 or the
early abortion pill—for use in the United States.53 The FDA
approved a specific regimen for administering mifepristone, but
soon thereafter abortion providers began to change the protocol.54
These adaptations were based on evidence from clinical trials
that suggested, among other things, that lower dosages of the
drug were equally effective and that the drug could safely and
effectively be administered later in pregnancy.55 This type of “offlabel” use of a drug is routine and completely legal.56
In 2004, however, Ohio enacted a law requiring abortion
providers to adhere to the original FDA-approved protocol.57
Planned Parenthood58 argued that this law unnecessarily
required higher dosages of medication with no medical
justification, and that the protocol increased the costs of
abortion.59 The plaintiffs challenged the requirement as
unconstitutionally vague, a violation of women’s bodily integrity,
and an undue burden.60
Addressing the bodily intrusion claim, the Sixth Circuit
recognized that “individuals possess a constitutional right to be
free from forcible physical intrusions of their bodies against their
will, absent a compelling state interest.”61 However, the court
found that the strict scrutiny that courts normally apply to
violations of bodily integrity does not apply to a bodily intrusion

52. Id. at 506.
53. Id. at 494.
54. Id. at 495.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 495–96.
57. See id. at 496 (describing Ohio House Bill 126, codified at OHIO REV.
CODE § 2919.123 (2006)).
58. Id. at 493–94. The plaintiffs included two Ohio Planned Parenthood
regional clinics and two Planned Parenthood directors. Id.
59. Id. at 496–97.
60. Id. at 498.
61. Id. at 506.
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that occurs in the context of abortion.62 The Sixth Circuit seemed
to view the plaintiffs as attempting to cheat by invoking a claim
that would merit higher scrutiny than the undue burden
standard:
Although we understand why Planned Parenthood took this
approach—requiring the government to show a compelling
state interest for the Act would relieve Planned Parenthood of
its obligation to show an undue burden on the right to choose
an abortion—this argument is unconvincing. “Strict scrutiny,
of course, no longer applies to abortion legislation.”63

The Sixth Circuit in DeWine regarded “[g]overnment
restrictions on abortions [as] a form of interference with the right
to bodily integrity and control over an individual’s person,”64 but
it interpreted the undue burden standard as swallowing the
bodily integrity analysis.65 Thus, the court said, the plaintiffs
retained a viable right to bodily integrity claim, but “the analysis
will map the undue-burden framework.”66
By lumping together all “restrictions on abortion” as
triggering (only) the undue burden standard, the Sixth Circuit
failed to recognize that the bodily integrity claim alleged in
DeWine was of a different quality than one focused on whether a
restriction places a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion, as the undue burden inquiry examines.67
The right to bodily integrity is a broad umbrella that
encompasses the right to affirmative decision-making about one’s
body as well as the right to repel unwanted bodily intrusions.68
Abortion restrictions may encompass the former if they
excessively burden a woman’s ability to choose abortion.69 In
62. See id.
63. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353
F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2003)).
64. Id. at 507.
65. See id. at 506–07.
66. Id. at 507.
67. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
68. Borgmann, The Constitutionality, supra note 33, at 5.
69. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 896 (“The effect of state regulation on a woman’s
protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such a case, as the State has
touched not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon the very bodily
integrity of the pregnant woman.”).
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DeWine, the specific bodily intrusion claim made about
medication abortion was of the latter category; the plaintiffs
argued that the restriction unnecessarily forced certain women,
who would otherwise be eligible for medication abortions under
the new protocol, to undergo surgery as the only means to
obtaining an abortion.70 As the court recognized, “forcible physical
intrusions of the body by their government” are normally subject
to strict scrutiny.71 These claims are not the same as a claim of
denied or burdened access to abortion.
The difference between the two claims should be clear from
the court’s separate discussion of the plaintiffs’ undue burden
claim. Both the majority and the dissenting judge discussed the
undue burden claim in terms of how the law burdened a woman’s
access to abortion, asking such questions as whether otherwiseeligible women who could not obtain a medication abortion
because of the law would forgo abortion altogether, and how
much the FDA protocol increased abortion costs as compared
with the new protocols.72 Nevertheless, the court viewed this very
distinct type of claim as preempting the claim that the state
should not be allowed to effectively force a woman to undergo
surgery, when another safe medical option is available, absent a
compelling reason.73
B. Equal Protection
There are a number of different types of equal protection
claims that might be brought against abortion restrictions. First,
claims may be divided based on whose rights are being asserted:
abortion providers or women seeking abortions.74 Next, equal
70. DeWine, 696 F.3d at 506
71. Id.
72. See id. at 514–18 (“[O]ur case law indicates a statute that ‘restrict[s]
the most commonly used procedure’ is likely to be problematic.” (quoting
Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 2003))); id. at
507–13 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“[A]t the least, statutes banning the most
common method of an abortion impose an unconstitutional burden on a woman’s
rights.”).
73. See id. at 507.
74. See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 162 (4th
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Greenville Women’s Clinic, the Charleston Women’s Medical
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protection claims asserting women’s rights can be of two
varieties: equal protection claims premised on abortion as a
fundamental right (“fundamental rights equal protection
claims”), and equal protection claims based on sex discrimination
(sex discrimination claims). Both of the latter types of equal
protection claims have fallen prey to undue burden preemption.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted fundamental
rights equal protection claims in the abortion context as being
subsumed within the undue burden standard. In Planned
Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v.
Dempsey,75 the plaintiff challenged on equal protection grounds,
among others, a Missouri law preventing abortion providers from
receiving state family planning funds.76 The court disagreed that
the law should be subject to strict scrutiny, noting that “[a]ny
constitutional right of clinics to provide abortion services . . . is
derived directly from women’s constitutional right to choose
abortion.”77 It noted that Casey established a new standard of
review for abortion regulations.78 The court then shifted to an
analysis indistinguishable from the undue burden standard,
including an assessment of whether the law would “have the
effect of placing an undue burden on women seeking abortion
services” and concluding that it would not.79
Similarly, in addressing targeted regulations of abortion
providers (TRAP laws), both the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals have held that equal protection claims premised on
abortion as a constitutionally protected right “collapse[] with the
undue burden claim.”80 This, the courts maintain, is because
Clinic, Inc., and Dr. William Lynn . . . brought this action seeking a declaratory
judgment that Regulation 61-12 is unconstitutional on its face because, among
other things, it would violate their . . . equal protection rights, as well as those of
their patients.”).
75. 167 F.3d 458 (8th Cir. 1999).
76. Id. at 460–61.
77. Id. at 464.
78. See id. at 464 (“Since Casey, we have applied the undue burden test in
cases involving legislation that affects the right to abortion.”).
79. Id.
80. Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 544–45 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 173 (4th Cir. 2000)
(“[B]ecause we have concluded . . . that South Carolina’s Regulation . . . does not
place an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make an abortion decision, there
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“Casey defined a new standard of judicial review for determining
when courts can recognize burdens on [the abortion] right as
unconstitutional, . . . replacing the traditional scrutiny analysis
with the undue burden test.”81
It is true that equal protection claims that challenge
classifications implicating the exercise of a constitutional right
often receive the same level of scrutiny traditionally applied to a
direct violation of that right.82 But this does not mean that courts
evaluating such equal protection claims should simply act as
though the claimant has alleged a violation of the substantive
right. An equal protection claim makes a distinct assertion,
namely that the differential treatment of the plaintiff is
unconstitutional.83 The level of protection afforded to the
underlying right helps to determine the level of scrutiny the court
should apply in determining whether the plaintiff is correct,84 but
it is not always appropriate to apply precisely the same test to a
claim of equal protection as would be applied to a claim directly
attacking a violation of the underlying right. This is particularly
so where the test applicable to the underlying substantive right is
one that focuses specifically on the extent of interference with the
is no need to resolve whether it remains a fundamental right for an equal
protection analysis and thus requires application of the strict-scrutiny
standard.” (citation omitted)).
81. Tucson Women’s Clinic, 378 F.3d at 544; see also Greenville Women’s
Clinic, 222 F.3d at 172–73 (“The Casey decision does not . . . apply the
traditional strict-scrutiny standard which protects fundamental rights. Rather,
the Court adopted an ‘undue burden’ standard.” (citation omitted)).
82. See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282–83 (1st Cir. 2005)
(analyzing an equal protection fundamental right to religious free exercise claim
by reference to the standard applicable to the free exercise claim).
83. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (indicating that
the Fourteenth Amendment is meant in part to ensure that “equal protection
and security should be given to all under like circumstances” and that “[c]lass
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited”
(citations and quotations omitted)).
84. See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating
Women’s Sexualtiy, 56 EMORY L.J. 1236, 1293 n.416 (2007) (noting that
“[c]lassifications made in legislation that burdens a fundamental right are
subject to strict scrutiny” (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–23
(2004))); Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 282–83 (“Because we held, above, that the
Religious Exclusion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, we apply rational
basis scrutiny to the fundamental rights based claim that this exclusion violates
equal protection.”).
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plaintiff’s exercise of that right. The undue burden standard, as
discussed above, is premised on access to abortion; it is ill-suited
to assessing claims that center instead on the unjustified
dissimilarity of the law’s treatment of the plaintiffs.85
Thus, for example, a law that deliberately singles out certain
religious adherents for differential treatment may be
unconstitutional even if the restriction only negligibly or
indirectly affects their ability to exercise their religion freely. In
Niemotko v. State of Maryland86 and Fowler v. Rhode Island,87
the Supreme Court held that policies were unconstitutionally
discriminatory where they denied Jehovah’s Witnesses, but not
other religious groups, the right to use public parks for religious
gatherings.88 In each case, the Court’s focus was on the disparate
treatment accorded the Witnesses. The Court did not appear
interested in the extent to which this burden impeded the
Witnesses’ ability to practice their religion freely. Rather, the
Court found objectionable the differential treatment of Witnesses
as compared with other religious groups. In Niemotko, for
example, the Court suggested that the Witnesses were being
discriminated against because of the particular religious views
and practices to which they adhered:
The conclusion is inescapable that the use of the park was
denied because of the City Council’s dislike for or
disagreement with the Witnesses or their views. The right to
equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms
of speech and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth
85. Strict scrutiny, in contrast, is equally well adapted to assessing claims
of discrimination as it is to assessing substantive rights violations, and indeed it
has historically been used to assess both kinds of claims. See, e.g., Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny to a classification
that burdened a certain class of individuals’ exercise of the fundamental right to
procreation).
86. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
87. 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
88. See Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272–73 (concluding that the government’s
“completely arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to grant permits” for use of
parks to Jehovah’s Witnesses, but not to other religious groups, was a denial of
equal protection); Fowler, 345 U.S. at 67–69 (finding that the government’s
refusal to allow the services of Jehovah’s Witnesses, yet not other religious
groups, violated the First Amendment); id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(concurring in the opinion of the Court but clarifying that the Equal Protection
Clause, not the First Amendment, is the relevant constitutional provision).
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Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims or
personal opinions of a local governing body.89

The availability of equal protection as a claim distinct from
undue burden is particularly important for laws—like TRAP
laws—that do not purport to promote any interest in the embryo
or fetus:
The deferential Casey standard [was] developed to balance
women’s liberty and privacy against the state interest in
protecting fetal life—an interest that [is] not related to the
licensing and facility requirements imposed on abortion clinics
by [TRAP] laws. By using the deferential Casey standard to
replace the strict or heightened scrutiny that the women’s
equal protection claims would normally warrant, these courts
effectively took the view that the equality rights of pregnant
women are attenuated when their unequal treatment relates
to abortion.90

Abortion restrictions that purport to promote women’s safety
are more likely to be pretextual than measures that openly aim to
discourage abortion or to promote the state’s interest in
embryonic or fetal life. TRAP laws that profess to make abortion
safer are in fact an increasingly potent part of the arsenal antiabortion-rights activists are employing in their fight to make
abortion illegal.91 Even where such laws do not succeed in
shutting down all clinics, they aim to make abortion disfavored in
the law, thereby “chang[ing] hearts and minds” on the issue and
ultimately, activists hope, paving the way for a complete ban.92
89. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272; see also Fowler, 345 U.S. at 69 (emphasizing
as “fatal to [the State’s] case” that “a religious service of Jehovah’s Witnesses is
treated differently than a religious service of other sects,” which “amounts to the
state preferring some religious groups over this one”).
90. Buchanan, supra note 84, at 1293.
91. Caitlin E. Borgmann, In Abortion Litigation, It’s the Facts That Matter,
127 HARV. L. REV. F. 149, 151 (2014) [hereinafter Borgmann, In Abortion
Litigation] (observing that, after signing a law that requires “abortion providers
[to] secure admitting privileges at nearby hospitals” the Mississippi governor
stated, “This is a historic day to begin the process of ending abortion in
Mississippi” (quotations omitted)).
92. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of
Truth for the Anti-Abortion Rights Movement, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245,
246–47 (2013) (describing the “incrementalist” strategy and citing anti-abortion
strategy memos); Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants:
Using Sex Equality Arguments to Demand Examination of State Interest in
Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 377, 389–91 (2011) (same).
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It should not matter whether these laws immediately achieve
their long-term goal of blocking abortion access. The fact that
they uniquely burden abortion without proper justification should
make the laws invalid.93 A recent Seventh Circuit decision
upholding a preliminary injunction of Wisconsin’s admitting
privileges law acknowledged the distinct lens that an equal
protection inquiry brings to cases of this kind, noting: “An issue of
equal protection of the laws is lurking in this case. For the state
seems indifferent to complications from non-hospital procedures
other than surgical abortion (especially other gynecological
procedures, even when they are more likely to produce
complications).”94
Because abortion remains a fundamental right after Casey,95
courts should apply strict scrutiny to fundamental rights equal
protection claims brought against abortion restrictions.96 In
Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant,97 the court wrongly assumed
the abortion right’s fundamental status was in doubt after
Casey.98 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Tucson Women’s
93. If courts were not so single-mindedly focused on the effects part of the
undue burden test and instead took the “purpose prong” more seriously as an
independent basis on which to invalidate an abortion law, the same conclusion
could be reached under the undue burden standard. See Borgmann, In Abortion
Litigation, supra note 91, at 149–50 (distinguishing between the purpose and
effects prongs of the undue burden test and noting that “it is possible to smoke
out illegitimate purposes indirectly”); see also id. at 150 (“Factually unsupported
laws that infringe constitutionally protected rights should not be allowed to
stand. Such a shortcoming infects an entire law and warrants its wholesale
invalidation.”).
94. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-2726, 2013 WL
6698596, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 2013).
95. Infra note 100.
96. See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 172–74
(4th Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs argued—albeit unsuccessfully—that South Carolina
clinic regulation must be analyzed under strict scrutiny because it treated
abortion differently from comparable medical procedures and implicated the
right to abortion); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (observing
that “classifications affecting fundamental rights . . . are given the most
exacting scrutiny” (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672
(1966))); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 54
(1983) (noting that “strict scrutiny [is] applied when government action
impinges upon a fundamental right”).
97. 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
98. Id. at 172 (“In Roe, the abortion-decision right was found to be
fundamental. But following Casey, that conclusion may be in doubt.” (citations

UNDUE BURDEN PREEMPTION

1065

Clinic v. Eden,99 this conclusion is contradicted by Casey itself.100
Yet, despite recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit, like the Fourth
Circuit, applied undue burden preemption rather than evaluating
the equal protection claim independently under strict scrutiny.
At the very least, given that abortion is not only a
fundamental but a controversial right, courts refusing to apply
strict scrutiny to such claims should apply “second-order rational
basis review” to fundamental rights equal protection claims in
order to ensure that laws are not enacted out of animus to
abortion providers.101 Had the Eighth Circuit in Dempsey applied
this review, for example, it would have inquired into whether the
state’s discrimination against abortion providers in the
distribution of state family planning funds reflected such
animus.102
We need not speculate as to the outcome the Eighth Circuit
would have reached to see that a traditional equal protection
analysis is a very different one from the undue burden standard
the court applied. The relevant questions should not be whether
the law was intended to or in fact prevented or unduly burdened
women’s access to abortion, but rather whether the state’s
asserted interest in preserving embryonic and fetal life was
sufficient to justify the disparate treatment of abortion providers,
and—if so—how the denial of family planning funds related to
omitted)).
99. 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).
100. See id. at 539 (“Women have a fundamental liberty interest, protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in obtaining an
abortion. . . . In Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this central holding of Roe
v. Wade.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 544 (“The right to abortion is a
fundamental constitutional right. Casey explicitly reaffirmed Roe’s holding in
this regard . . . .”).
101. Cf. id. at 545–46 (recognizing “that abortion providers can be a
politically unpopular group” but finding that “no evidence has been presented
that is sufficient to create an issue of material fact as to whether there is a
stigmatizing or animus based purpose to the law”).
102. Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv. Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (referring to majority opinion’s
apparent but unacknowledged application of heightened scrutiny under guise of
rational basis review as “‘second order’ rational-basis review”); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular
group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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that goal.103 In fact, if the court was correct that the funding ban
had a negligible impact on the availability of abortion because
those abortions were paid for with private funds anyway,104 this
would seemingly undermine the state’s justification for denying
such funds. That denial would not save a single fetus, according
to the court,105 nor could the state plausibly claim that family
planning funds were contributing to the destruction of fetuses.106
Even if the court were to conclude that the law did not violate
equal protection, it should have done so by focusing on the state’s
differential treatment of abortion and abortion providers, not on
whether the restriction imposed an “undue burden” on women’s
access to abortion.
In addition to fundamental rights equal protection, sex
discrimination provides another ground for challenging some
abortion restrictions. Yet, here too, undue burden preemption has
reared its head. In Tucson, plaintiffs separately claimed that the
Arizona TRAP law constituted sex discrimination because it
targeted for special burdens medical procedures sought only by
women.107 Although the Ninth Circuit did not rule out the
possibility that the law discriminated based on sex, it invoked
undue burden preemption, rendering plaintiff’s claim
irrelevant.108

103. Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 F.3d
458, 460–61 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to
Tier I of § 10.715 of the Missouri code, which “prohibits family-planning funds
from being used to perform, assist, encourage, or make direct referrals for
abortions” and “provides that organizations or affiliates of organizations that
‘provide or promote abortions’ are not eligible for family-planning funds”).
104. See id. at 465 (noting that Planned Parenthood’s abortion services were
“funded through independent private sources”).
105. See id at 464–65 (noting that, contrary to the district court’s findings,
“the record suggests that the legislature was aware that denying Planned
Parenthood’s family-planning funds would not affect Planned Parenthood’s
ability to provide abortion services”).
106. See id at 465 (noting that “Planned Parenthood has consistently
maintained that State family-planning funds do not subsidize abortion services
in any way” and “abortion services are funded through independent private
sources”).
107. Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 547 (9th Cir. 2004).
108. Infra text accompanying note 114.
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Geduldig v. Aiello109 in
1974, it was generally believed that sex discrimination claims
challenging classifications based on pregnancy (including laws
targeting abortion) were no longer tenable.110 In Geduldig, the
Court appeared to shut the door on such claims when it found
that discrimination based on pregnancy was not (necessarily) sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.111 In 2003,
however, in Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs,112 the
Supreme Court “implied that laws which facially discriminate on
the basis of pregnancy, even those that facially appear to benefit
pregnant persons, can still be unconstitutional if the medical or
biological facts that distinguish pregnancy do not reasonably
explain the discrimination at hand.”113 The Ninth Circuit,
seemingly breathing new life into sex discrimination claims in the
abortion context, agreed that “Hibbs strongly supports plaintiffs’
argument that singling out abortion in ways unrelated to the
facts distinguishing abortion from other medical procedures is an
unconstitutional form of discrimination on the basis of gender.”114
But then, with the next breath, the court snuffed the flame.
It concluded that, “even if laws singling out abortion can be
judicially recognized as not gender neutral, where such laws
facially promote maternal health or fetal life, Casey replaces the
intermediate scrutiny such a law would normally receive under
the equal protection clause with the undue burden standard”115
Inexplicably, the court suggested that Casey had specifically
supplanted equal protection claims with the undue burden
109. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
110. See Smith, supra note 92, at 383 (noting that the Geduldig case “was
read as a broad rejection of the claim that pregnancy discrimination is sex
discrimination”).
111. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (“While it is true that only women
can become pregnant it does not follow that every legislative classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.”). But see Smith, supra note
92, at 386 (noting that “Geduldig left open the possibility that some pregnancy
classifications would constitute sex discrimination”).
112. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
113. Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 538 U.S. at 733 n.6).
114. Id. at 548.
115. Id. at 549.
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standard,116 although the joint opinion in Casey did not analyze
the challenged provisions under Equal Protection Clause at all.117
If the Ninth Circuit had applied intermediate scrutiny to the sex
discrimination equal protection claim at issue in Tucson, it would
have asked whether the Arizona TRAP law was supported by an
“exceedingly persuasive” justification, and whether the
“‘discriminatory means employed’ [were] ‘substantially related to
the achievement of important governmental objectives.’”118 Again,
this analysis is a very different one from the undue burden
standard that the court applied. The relevant questions should be
not whether the law was intended to or in fact prevented or
unduly burdened women’s access to abortion, but rather whether
the state could justify the differential treatment of abortion
providers by showing that the TRAP law was closely related to its
stated goal of protecting women’s health. In addressing these
questions, the burden of justification would have been on the
State, not the plaintiffs.119 Instead, the Ninth Circuit’s flawed
analysis rendered wholly superfluous the plaintiffs’ distinct claim
premised on sex discrimination.120
C. Compelled Speech
Compelled speech is the one claim besides the plaintiffs’
substantive due process claim that the Court specifically
116. See id. at 539 (“[A] plurality of the Court abandoned both traditional
equal protection scrutiny analysis and the accompanying trimester framework of
Roe . . . .” (emphasis added)).
117. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47
(1992) (explaining that the right to abortion is protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 884–85 (briefly analyzing
“informed consent” provision under First Amendment).
118. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996).
119. See id. (noting that “[t]he burden of justification [of gender
classifications] is demanding and it rests entirely on the State”).
120. Cf. Smith, supra note 92, (explaining how “analyzing abortion
restrictions using a sex equality analysis” can create a more multi-dimensional
understanding of how abortion restrictions violate women’s rights); Reva B.
Siegel, Abortion As a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST HISTORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
MOTHERHOOD 43, 67–68 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995)
(same).
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addressed in Casey.121 Casey by no means compels or even
justifies undue burden preemption of free speech claims in the
abortion context. But the joint opinion is sufficiently confusing in
its treatment of physicians’ First Amendment claims to have
sowed confusion among lower courts as to whether or how the
undue burden standard and compelled speech doctrine intersect.
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held that compelled speech claims against pre-abortion
ultrasound requirements and other mandated pre-abortion
disclosures are essentially coextensive with undue burden claims
against these laws.122 As with bodily integrity and equal
protection claims, this results in a weakening of First
Amendment compelled speech claims when they are raised in the
context of abortion.
Generally, the Supreme Court closely reviews laws that
target speech for regulation based on agreement or disagreement
with the speaker’s viewpoint.123 The Court has explained:
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed are content based. . . . By contrast, laws that
confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference
to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content
neutral.124

When laws discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, the Supreme
Court generally applies “the most exacting scrutiny.”125 This
rigorous scrutiny applies equally to laws that limit speech and
121. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (addressing claim by petitioners of “an
asserted First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about
the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State”
(citation omitted)).
122. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]nformed consent laws that do not impose an undue
burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion are permissible if they require
truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures. . . . [S]uch laws are . . .
reasonable regulation[s] of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of
compelling ‘ideological’ speech . . . .”).
123. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
(“Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that
suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of
its content.”).
124. Id. at 643.
125. Id. at 642.
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those that “compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing
a particular message.”126
The Supreme Court has recently held that any “contentbased” or “speaker-based” restriction on speech warrants
heightened scrutiny.127 Thus, even in the context of commercial
speech, which has traditionally received less constitutional
protection,128 the Court has skeptically viewed restrictions it sees
as discriminating based on the content of the speech or identity of
the speaker.129 Following these precedents, in R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA,130 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit applied heightened scrutiny to strike down
an FDA rule requiring new textual warnings and graphic images
on cigarette packaging.131 The court found that the warnings
“represent[ed] an ongoing effort to discourage consumers from
buying the [tobacco] Companies’ products, rather than . . . a
measure designed to combat specific deceptive claims.”132
The Supreme Court’s precedents calling for stringent review
of content-based speech restrictions have been applied to
invalidate
state
interference
with
doctor–patient
communications. For example, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a
federal governmental policy that threatened to punish physicians
for discussing with their patients the medical use of marijuana.133
126. Id. (citations omitted); see also Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014
WL 186310, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (stating, in the context of a challenge
to pre-abortion ultrasound mandate, that content-based, government-compelled
speech is generally subject to strict scrutiny).
127. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664–65 (2011)
(applying heightened scrutiny in the context of commercial speech).
128. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (noting
that the Court has “afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm of noncommercial expression”).
129. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664–65 (finding that the law at issue “is
designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on protected expression”
and rejecting the State’s argument “that heightened judicial scrutiny is
unwarranted because its law is mere commercial regulation”).
130. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
131. The court applied intermediate rather than strict scrutiny because the
case involved “compelled commercial speech.” Id. at 1217–18.
132. Id. at 1216.
133. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002).
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The court found that the law was content based, and therefore
subject to heightened scrutiny, because it “condemn[ed]
expression of a particular viewpoint, i.e., that medical marijuana
would likely help a specific patient.”134 Similarly, a federal
district court recently enjoined a Florida law that forbade doctors
to discuss gun ownership safety with their patients as part of the
practice of preventive medicine.135 Florida asserted that the law
was intended to “prevent . . . harassment and discrimination by
health care providers against patients based on their ownership
of firearms.”136 The court described the statute as “impos[ing]
content-based restrictions on [physicians’] speech.”137 The court
found that “[t]he State, through this law, inserts itself in the
doctor–patient relationship, prohibiting and burdening speech
necessary to the proper practice of preventive medicine.”138
Casey did not appear to apply heightened scrutiny to the
“informed consent” provision at issue there, even though some of
the required information clearly conveyed the state’s ideological
opposition to abortion.139 The statute in Casey “require[d] that, at
least [twenty-four] hours before performing an abortion, a
physician inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the
health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and ‘the probable
gestational age of the unborn child.’”140 It also required that “[t]he
physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of
the availability of printed materials published by the State
describing the fetus and providing information about medical
assistance for childbirth, . . . child support from the father, and a
list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as
alternatives to abortion.”141 To the extent that some of the

134. Id. at 637; see also id. at 639 (stating that “the government’s policy
must have the requisite ‘narrow specificity’” (citing Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement
of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))).
135. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255–56, 1270 (S.D.
Fla. 2013).
136. Id. at 1256.
137. Id. at 1261.
138. Id. at 1266.
139. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
140. Id. at 881.
141. Id.
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information was clearly viewpoint-based,142 Casey’s failure to
clearly apply heightened scrutiny seems inconsistent with
existing case law.143
States have wide latitude to regulate the medical profession
in the interests of ensuring the public’s safety.144 This interest
has prompted nearly every state to compel medical practitioners
to convey information deemed necessary for a patient’s informed
consent.145 The general purpose of informed consent laws is to
142. Telling women about the nature of the procedure and the risks of
abortion and childbirth is the kind of information that is typically conveyed in
normal informed consent dialogues. Infra note 146. But information that
conveys what the embryo or fetus looks like, or that makes the alternative of
childbirth seem more attractive or financially tenable, has nothing to do with
the medical aspects of the woman’s decision and is only provided because the
state prefers that women choose childbirth. See id. at 935–36 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The requirements . . . that the
woman be advised that medical assistance benefits may be available, and that
the father is responsible for financial assistance in the support of the child
similarly are poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion
decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Pennsylvania does not require
that women seeking prenatal care be told of the options of abortion or adoption.
But see Texas Med. Providers v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132,
at *5 (W.D. Texas Feb. 6, 2012) (describing the plaintiffs’ compelled speech
claims in Casey as bordering on frivolous, unlike the First Amendment issue
before the court).
143. Although the Supreme Court had not earlier evaluated similar
“informed consent” laws under free speech doctrine, it did recognize that
mandating specific information that is not normally part of medical informed
consent was an impermissible attempt by the state to convey its viewpoint
through the doctor. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 760–64 (1986) (invalidating disclosure requirements similar to
those in Casey and describing them as “nothing less than an outright attempt to
wedge the State’s message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the
informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician”), overruled by
Casey, 505 U.S. 833. But see City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 n.37 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (noting in
dicta that mandating “the availability of information on birth control and
adoption . . . and the availability of assistance during pregnancy and after
childbirth” if accurate, “certainly is not objectionable”).
144. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd.
of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply strict
scrutiny where state psychologist licensing scheme “was not adopted because of
any disagreement with psychoanalytical theories”).
145. See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed
Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429,
430 (2006) (noting that forty-eight states have adopted either a physician-based
or patient-based standard for informed consent).
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inform, not to persuade or to convey a particular moral point of
view.146 “Informed consent” requirements like those validated in
Casey, however, perform a very different function. Abortion
disclosure laws have nothing to do with the practice of medicine
or with ensuring patients’ safety147 and everything to do with
conveying the state’s disapproval of abortion.148 For this reason,
one would expect that they would be treated as other viewpoint
discriminatory laws and subjected to at least heightened, if not
strict, scrutiny.149 Casey, however, did not clearly subject the
disclosure mandate there to strict or heightened scrutiny. Casey’s
treatment of the disclosure mandate is confusing and in part
seemingly conflates due process analysis with First Amendment
analysis. This has led some lower courts to conclude that First
Amendment claims raised against abortion restrictions receive
less protection.
In addressing the mandated disclosure law at issue in Casey,
the Supreme Court first determined whether the requirement

146. See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s
Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 816 (1996) (pointing
out that “the moral appropriateness of a particular medical procedure is
normally assumed to be outside the proper range of physician disclosures”).
147. This differentiates them, for example, from laws prohibiting the
practice of sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE), as the latter are intended
to protect patients from harm. See, e.g., King v. Christie, Civ. Action No. 135038, 2013 WL 5970343, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2013) (“[D]octor-patient
communications about medical treatment receive substantial First
Amendment protection, but the government has more leeway to regulate the
conduct necessary to administering treatment itself.” (quoting Pickup v. Brown,
728 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013))); Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *24 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (“[T]he
plaintiffs’ protected fundamental right is a patient’s decision whether to seek
treatment or not; but a patient’s ‘selection of a particular treatment, or at least a
medication, is within the area of governmental interest in protecting health.’”),
aff’d, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013).
148. See Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 179–80 (2013) (“Most of the states that have enacted preabortion disclosure laws have designed the disclosures to discourage abortion
and/or promote fetal life.”).
149. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Federation of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 798–801 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny to a state’s content-based law
compelling certain speech); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (concluding that the state may not “prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion”).
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violated the undue burden standard.150 The Court’s
admonishment that any mandated information be “truthful and
not misleading”151 seemed to refer to normal medical informed
consent requirements,152 which mandate the provision of factual
information to allow a patient autonomy in making her own
decision about her care.153 But the joint opinion also emphasized
the state’s prerogative to express its moral opposition to abortion
and even to attempt to convince women not to choose abortion:
the opinion stated, “Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the
State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage [a
woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments
of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing
the pregnancy to full term.”154 The Court thus concluded that
“informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that
all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made
irrelevant.”155
The Court next, very briefly, addressed whether the
mandated disclosure violated physicians’ First Amendment right
not to speak.156 The Court implicitly acknowledged that the First
Amendment ordinarily protects against government-compelled
speech, citing Wooley v. Maynard,157 which held that New
Hampshire could not constitutionally require citizens to display
150. Infra notes 172–202 and accompanying text.
151. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
152. See id. at 882–84 (comparing information disclosure for abortion with
other procedures, observing that “a requirement that a doctor give a
woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for
constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give
certain specific information about any medical procedure”).
153. See id. at 881 (“Our prior decisions establish that as with any medical
procedure, the State may require a woman to give her written informed consent
to an abortion.”).
154. Id. at 872 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 883; see also id. at 882 (“We also see no reason why the State may
not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of
materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those
consequences have no direct relation to her health.”).
156. Id. at 884.
157. 430 U.S. 705 (1977); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (“To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights
not to speak are implicated . . . .” (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977))).
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the state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their vehicle license
plates.158 Without further discussion of Wooley, the Casey Court
next, in the same sentence, turned to the state’s police power to
subject the practice of medicine to “reasonable licensing and
regulation.”159 For this proposition, the Court cited Whalen v.
Roe,160 a case in which physicians and patients challenged a law
that required prescription information to be reported to the
state.161
As commentators have observed, the juxtaposition of these
two cases is odd and renders opaque the Court’s meaning.162
Wooley is a First Amendment case establishing that laws
requiring speakers to utter the state’s ideological viewpoint are
constitutionally impermissible.163 Yet in discussing the
physicians’ First Amendment claim, the Casey joint opinion
referred not to the permissibility of mandating that phyisicians
provide information conveying the state’s ideological opposition to
abortion but only to the permissibility of requiring “information

158. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
159. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
160. 429 U.S. 589 (1977); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (observing that
physicians’ First Amendment rights to speak must be analyzed “as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State”
(citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977))).
161. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591 (“The constitutional question presented is
whether the State of New York may record, in a centralized computer file, the
names and addresses of all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doctor’s
prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a lawful and an unlawful
market.”).
162. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and
the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 773–74
(1999) (“To fuse these two models in a shorthand formulation provides little
indication of how to resolve any professional’s First Amendment claim other
than the precise one at issue in Casey.”); Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech
and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2355 (2013) (“Neither Wooley nor
Whalen discusses the First Amendment rights of physicians, so these citations
provide little illumination of the balance between the general First Amendment
protections against compelled speech and the state’s power to regulate medical
professionals.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 946 (“Exactly
how the strict First Amendment standards of Wooley are meant to qualify the
broad police power discretion of Whalen is left entirely obscure.”).
163. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
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about the risks of abortion, and childbirth.”164 The stronger First
Amendment claim, that the state should not compel ideological
speech or regulate speech based on its disagreement with the
speaker’s viewpoint, was left unaddressed.165
Whalen, on the other hand, is not about free speech at all.
The Whalen plaintiffs had claimed that law violated the right to
privacy, not the First Amendment.166 The Court in Whalen
disagreed that the statute violated the plaintiffs’ rights to privacy
of personal information and independence in making important
personal decisions.167 Casey’s reliance on a privacy case to resolve
physicians’ free speech claims sows confusion about the
relationship, if any, between privacy claims and free speech
claims against compelled disclosures in the abortion context.
Nevertheless, as two federal district courts have observed, it
seems unlikely that the authors of the Casey joint opinion
intended to “analytically merge the First Amendment rights of
doctors with the Fourteenth Amendment rights of women.”168
164. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(emphasis added); see also Keighley, supra note 162, at 2355–56 (“The risk
information pointed to by the Court assuredly is the type of information that a
physician already has a duty to give a patient in order to get that patient’s
informed consent to the abortion procedure.”).
165. As discussed above, the joint opinion in Casey addressed the ideological
information mandated by the Pennsylvania law only in the context of assessing
whether it imposed an undue burden. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83.
166. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) (“The District Court
enjoined enforcement of the portions of the New York State Controlled
Substances Act of 1972 which require such recording on the ground that they
violate appellees’ constitutionally protected rights of privacy.” (footnote
omitted)).
167. See id. at 602 (“[I]t is, of course, true that private information must be
disclosed to the . . . New York Department of Health. Such disclosures, however,
are not . . . meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant
invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care.”).
168. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012); see also Stuart v.
Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 1863, at *17 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014)
(“Despite its brevity, [Casey’s] First Amendment analysis is clearly a traditional
one . . . . Casey did not purport to carve out a new First Amendment exception or
create a new standard of review for all abortion-related speech cases.”); cf.
Keighley, supra note 162, at 2361–64 (arguing that Casey should not be read as
endorsing the constitutionality under the First Amendment of requirements
that abortion providers personally communicate to their patients—rather than
merely make available in written form—the substance of a state’s ideological
message). Indeed, given the minimal attention plaintiffs devoted to the First
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Invoking Casey, some lower courts have applied a deferential
standard to uphold abortion laws that—more obviously than in
Casey—insert the state into a doctor’s relationship with her
patient for ideological reasons.169 Some have done so by
deliberately blurring the lines between the undue burden
standard and First Amendment doctrine.170
The Fifth Circuit has expressly interpreted Casey as
tethering abortion providers’ free speech claims to the undue
burden standard. In May 2011, Texas amended its abortion
disclosure law to require that, before performing an abortion,
physicians conduct and display a sonogram of the embryo or
fetus, make audible the heartbeat for the woman to hear, and
verbally explain to her the results of both procedures, including
detailed descriptions of the fetus or embryo and a simultaneous
verbal explanation of the heart auscultation.171 A woman may
decline to view the images or hear the heartbeat, but in most
circumstances she may not decline to receive an explanation of
the sonogram images.172 No less than the anti-smoking messages
in R.J. Reynolds, these requirements are an “unabashed
attempt[] to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and
browbeat” abortion patients into choosing childbirth over
abortion.173

Amendment issue in their briefs and at oral argument in Casey, it seems unwise
to read too much into the Court’s brief free speech discussion. See Keighley,
supra note 162, at 2357–61 (describing the limited focus on the free speech
question in the Casey litigation).
169. See infra text accompanying notes 178–179 (discussing Planned
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 733–35 (8th Cir. 2008)
(en banc)).
170. See Corbin, supra note 2, at 1190–92 (“[Courts] dodge the doctors’ free
speech claims by applying the Casey undue burden test . . . .”); Keighley, supra
note 162, at 2349 (“[T]he Fifth Circuit recently set forth . . . that physicians
retain virtually no First Amendment rights while they are practicing
medicine. . . . This model . . . essentially collapses the First Amendment inquiry
with Casey’s analysis of women’s substantive due process rights.”).
171. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2014).
172. See id. § 171.012(b)–(d) (providing that the required information be
provided orally, that the web address on which the printed materials may be
found be disclosed, and that it include the likelihood of obtaining child support).
173. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1217
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
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In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortions v. Lakey,174
abortion providers challenged these restrictions on a variety of
grounds, including that they unconstitutionally compel
physicians to engage in government-mandated speech and that
they violate abortion patients’ right not to speak by compelling
them to certify the physician’s compliance with the procedures.175
The plaintiffs did not challenge the requirements on undue
burden grounds.176 The district court understood that the
plaintiffs’ choice to challenge the requirements on compelled
speech grounds meant the court could not simply evaluate the
requirements based on Casey’s undue burden analysis of
Pennsylvania’s mandated disclosure requirement:
This Court quotes substantial portions of Casey[’s] [undue
burden analysis of Pennsylvania’s mandated disclosure law]
because Defendants rely heavily on [that] language in arguing
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge lacks merit.
However, . . . the Supreme Court’s discussion is in the context
of a constitutional challenge based upon a woman’s Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process right to an abortion, not a First
Amendment challenge. Accordingly, while the Court’s
statements may be instructive on the First Amendment issue,
they are not dispositive.177

In addressing plaintiffs’ compelled speech claim, the district
court applied strict scrutiny.178 Finding the physician–patient
dialog to be either noncommercial speech or mixed commercial
and noncommercial speech, the court noted that, “[o]utside the
commercial context, ‘content-based regulations of speech are
presumptively invalid.’”179 The court then found that the new
174. 806 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570
(5th Cir. 2012).
175. See id. at 949 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ claims).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 971–72.
178. See id. at 970.
179. Id. at 969 (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188
(2007)); see also Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 1863, at *10
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (stating, in context of pre-abortion ultrasound speech
and display requirement, that “[r]equiring a physician or other health care
provider to deliver the state’s content-based, non-medical message in his or her
own voice as if the message was his or her own constitutes compelled ideological
speech and warrants the highest degree of First Amendment protection”).
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Texas requirements violated the First Amendment rights of both
abortion patients and their doctors.180 The court concluded:
The net result of these provisions is: (1) a physician is required
to say things and take expressive actions with which the
physician may not ideologically agree, and which the physician
may feel are medically unnecessary; (2) the pregnant woman
must not only passively receive this potentially unwanted
speech and expression, but must also actively participate—in
the best case by simply signing an election form, and in the
worst case by disclosing in writing extremely personal,
medically irrelevant facts; and (3) the entire experience must
be memorialized in records that are, at best, semi-private.181

Unlike the district court, the Fifth Circuit in Lakey saw
Casey’s undue burden analysis as inextricably linked to, and
determinative of, compelled speech challenges to mandated
disclosure laws in the abortion context.182 The Fifth Circuit panel
relied not just on Casey but also on Gonzales v. Carhart,183 which
stated that “the government may use its voice and its regulatory
authority to show its profound respect for the life within the
woman.”184 Gonzales did not involve any free speech challenge to
the federal “partial-birth abortion” ban at issue there.185 But this
did not matter to the Fifth Circuit, which made clear that it
viewed the answer to the undue burden question as dispositive of
the compelled speech claim:
The import of these cases is clear. First, informed consent laws
that do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to
have an abortion are permissible if they require truthful,
nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures. Second, such laws
are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of medical practice
180. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortions v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp.
2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (“[T]he Act compels physicians to advance an
ideological agenda with which they may not agree . . . . Accordingly, the Court
finds the Act’s compelled speech requirements . . . are unconstitutional
violations of the First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech.”),
vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Stuart, 2014 WL 186310,
at *20 (finding a similar law unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
181. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
182. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012).
183. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
184. Id. at 128.
185. See id. at 132–33 (summarizing the plaintiff’s claims).
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and do not fall under the rubric of compelling “ideological”
speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny. Third,
“relevant” informed consent may entail not only the physical
and psychological risks to the expectant mother facing this
“difficult moral decision,” but also the state’s legitimate
interests in “protecting the potential life within her.”186

The Fifth Circuit saw Casey’s undue burden standard not
simply as relevant to the compelled speech question, but as
displacing it. In the Fifth Circuit’s view, it is not possible for an
abortion restriction to violate a constitutional right independent
of a woman’s right to access abortion.187 Like the Sixth Circuit
considering a bodily integrity claim in DeWine, the Fifth Circuit
in Lakey viewed the doctors’ First Amendment claims with
suspicion, as if the plaintiffs were somehow impermissibly
seeking an end-run around the undue burden standard.188 The
court labeled as an “omission” the plaintiffs’ failure to argue that
the ultrasound requirements amounted to an undue burden,
describing it as “significant.”189 The Fifth Circuit observed: “[I]f
[the restrictions] would not violate the woman’s privacy right
under the Casey plurality opinion, then Appellees would, by
means of their First Amendment claim, essentially trump the
balance Casey struck between women’s rights and the states’
prerogatives.”190 Thus, like the court in DeWine, the Fifth Circuit
186. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576 (emphases added).
187. The one exception to this appears to be vagueness, which the Fifth
Circuit appears to view as independent of the undue burden standard. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s treatment of the
void for vagueness claim in Lakey).
188. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2 n.6 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (“An early point
of departure between this Court’s analysis and the [Fifth Circuit] panel’s is that
this Court takes Plaintiffs’ claims at face value . . . whereas the panel
apparently sees it as . . . about women’s right to an abortion—an issue
specifically disclaimed by Plaintiffs in this suit.”).
189. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
577 (5th Cir. 2012). The district court questioned how such an omission could be
“significant” if the plaintiffs were not even making an undue burden claim. See
Lakey, 2012 WL 373132, at *3 (noting that “Plaintiffs may have failed to make
such allegations precisely because they were bringing First Amendment
challenges on behalf of doctors” and “[Plaintiffs]—like this Court— court were
surprised by the panel’s apparent importation of a Fourteenth Amendment
‘undue burden’ standard into their First Amendment compelled speech claims.”).
190. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577.
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appears to view the undue burden standard as occupying the field
of abortion regulation. Because these courts see the undue
burden standard as striking a careful “balance” on the issue of
abortion, they see any other claim that might invalidate an
abortion restriction is seen as upsetting this balance.191 As
discussed in Part II, this kind of “field preemption” is
unprecedented in constitutional law.192 The federal district court
in Lakey, on remand, accused the Fifth Circuit panel of
“creat[ing] a special rule for informed consent for abortions” not
supported by Casey.193
The Eighth Circuit has come close to applying undue burden
preemption to a compelled speech claim, albeit less obviously. In
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds,194 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, refused to enjoin a requirement that
abortion providers give a written statement to their patients
asserting that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being.”195 While the Eighth
Circuit in Rounds did not as openly conflate the undue burden
and First Amendment analyses as did the Fifth Circuit, its
analysis still seems unlikely to be applied to any viewpointdiscriminatory speech regulation other than a post-Casey
abortion law. The problem is that the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
interpret “truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a
patient’s decision” to encompass not just information typical to
ordinary medical informed consent requirements—such as the
comparative medical risks of abortion and childbirth—but also
“information” clearly mandated purely for ideological reasons.196
191. See id.; see also Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 549 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is not necessary to determine whether the classification should
be deemed gender-neutral, because the interests at stake should be balanced by
simply applying the Casey undue burden standard.”).
192. See supra Part II (discussing the prevailing approach of analyzing each
constitutional claim separately according to each applicable doctrine); see also
infra Part IV (critiquing undue burden preemption).
193. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012).
194. 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
195. Id. at 735.
196. See, e.g., id. at 734–35 (“[T]he State . . . can use its regulatory authority
to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant
to a patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also
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Indeed, in Rounds, the Eighth Circuit strained mightily to read
the language at issue as non-ideological, interpreting it to mean
simply that the embryo or fetus is biologically human, a fact that
no woman of sound mind needs a doctor to tell her.197 Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit in Lakey described ultrasound images as
“surely . . . the purest conceivable expression of ‘factual
information,’”198 although one wonders whether it would have
seen the graphic anti-smoking photos in R.J. Reynolds in the
same light.199
Despite its confusing treatment of Pennsylvania’s mandated
information law, Casey does not provide support for the idea that
ideologically motivated disclosure requirements—such as those in
Lakey and Rounds—do not violate the First Amendment. Casey
did say that the state may express its preference for childbirth
under the undue burden standard,200 but it omitted any mention
of such ideologically motivated speech in its First Amendment
discussion.201 The district court in Lakey saw through the game
being played by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, saying of the Fifth
Circuit panel decision:
[T]he result is that doctors may permissibly be compelled to
parrot anything the state deems necessary to further its
“legitimate interests in protecting the potential life within” the
pregnant woman, provided the message does not impose an
undue burden on the woman’s right to have an abortion. That
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.”).
197. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Eighth Circuit to Pregnant Women: You’re
Not Carrying a Dolphin!, REPROD. RIGHTS. PROF BLOG (June 27, 2008),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2008/06/eighth-circui-1.
html (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (“Just think of all those scores of women who
have flocked to abortion clinics under the sad misimpression that they were
carrying developing dolphins. The women of South Dakota can rest safely in the
knowledge that . . . they will at last understand the mystery of their
pregnancy . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
198. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
577 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012).
199. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (discussing how the
court applied heightened scrutiny in R.J. Reynolds to strike down an FDA rule
requiring graphic images on cigarette packaging because it “represent[ed] an
ongoing effort to discourage consumers from buying the [tobacco] Companies’
products”).
200. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
201. Id.; supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
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is, within the abortion context, the doctor’s right to speak, or
not to speak, is wholly dependent on the contours of a woman’s
right to an abortion. . . . [T]his Court is concerned with the
panel’s implicit conflation of “reasonable regulation of medical
practice,” with “truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant
disclosures”—particularly given the panel’s broad definition of
“relevant” in this context. As this Court reads the panel’s
opinion, an extended presentation, consisting of graphic
images of aborted fetuses, and heartfelt testimonials about the
horrors of abortion, would be “truthful, nonmisleading, and
relevant.” Accordingly, the government could apparently
require doctors personally to make such presentations prior to
performing abortions . . . .202

Courts should recognize that compelled speech claims address a
very different interest than whether a woman’s right to access
abortion has been unduly burdened. There is no reason why
ordinary First Amendment doctrine should not apply to these
claims. Under that doctrine, viewpoint discriminatory,
mandatory abortion disclosures should be assessed under strict
scrutiny.
IV. A Critique of Undue Burden Preemption
The undue burden standard makes sense only as an inquiry
that focuses on access to abortion. The Supreme Court in Casey
specifically described Roe’s “essential holding” as establishing
“the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the
State.”203 The Court then went on to modify this standard to
allow more restrictions on abortion access, so long as these were
not unduly burdensome.204 The undue burden standard expressly
202. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (referring to
language used by the Fifth Circuit’s panel decision in Tex. Med. Providers
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574–80 (5th Cir. 2012))
(footnote omitted); see also Stuart v. Loomis, No. 1:11-CV-804, 2014 WL 1863, at
*17 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014) (“With due respect, Lakey and Rounds are wrongly
decided. . . . The application of a due process standard to a First Amendment
issue improperly conflates two separate constitutional doctrines in a way that
gives short shrift to the First Amendment.”).
203. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added).
204. See id. at 878.
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looks at whether a law has the “purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion.”205 It therefore makes sense to apply the undue burden
standard only to assertions that a law burdens, limits, or bars
women’s access to abortion.
Abortion restrictions, however, often go beyond limiting
access to abortion, implicating other distinct rights. The fact that
an ultrasound law compels a physician to communicate certain
information to a patient implicates the physician’s First
Amendment rights irrespective of whether the law affects
women’s ability to obtain abortions. That same law also
implicates a woman’s bodily integrity, by forcing her to undergo a
procedure ranging from somewhat to intensely intrusive,
depending on the type of sonogram performed.206 Like the doctor’s
compelled speech claim, the woman’s bodily intrusion claim exists
independently of whether the requirement hampers or prevents
her access to abortion. Even if abortion remains freely available
and is no more expensive than before, her bodily integrity has
been violated.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s prevailing approach
to constitutional adjudication recognizes that a single claim may
implicate more than one constitutional provision.207 In United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, the Court recognized
that the Fourth Amendment did not preempt the Fifth
Amendment due process claim raised there because the claims
were not interchangeable.208 The same principle holds true in the
abortion context. Undue burden preemption allows the undue
burden standard to gobble up, Pac-Man-like, wholly distinct
constitutional claims that assert interests different from abortion
access and sometimes even the interests of people other than
205. Id.
206. See Borgmann, The Constitutionality, supra note 33, at 67–72 (arguing
that state-compelled pre-abortion sonography should be evaluated under strict
scrutiny because, when conducted for the state’s ideological purposes, it is a
significant physical and dignitary intrusion on a woman’s body).
207. Supra Part II.
208. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52 (1993)
(concluding that the government’s action, in purpose and effect, went “beyond
the traditional meaning of search and seizure,” justifying the application of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
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abortion patients. There is nothing in Casey that justifies such an
alarming expansion of the undue burden standard. Indeed, by
separately analyzing the (tentatively argued) free speech claims
raised in Casey,209 the Court clearly regarded these claims as
distinct, confusing though its discussion may have been.
The Graham doctrine—which allows certain constitutional
claims to displace substantive due process claims—likewise does
not support undue burden preemption.210 In fact, undue burden
preemption turns the Graham doctrine on its head. Under
Graham, courts avoid applying substantive due process, the very
source of the right to abortion protected by the undue burden
standard.211 If Graham is justified—which itself is
questionable212—it is on the grounds that substantive due process
is not grounded in explicit constitutional text and therefore lacks
sufficient guideposts for courts.213 The Court at least plausibly
claims to prefer to analyze governmental action under an express
constitutional provision, where that provision clearly applies.214
In such cases, the Court purports to apply an analysis that it
views as more or less interchangeable with (albeit more specific
than) the substantive due process claim.215
These justifications do not apply to undue burden
preemption. First, Graham’s impulse to avoid wading into the
uncharted waters of substantive due process cannot possibly
209. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part II (describing the Graham doctrine).
211. See supra Part II (discussing the prevailing approach to analyzing
constitutional issues, and the Graham doctrine’s exception for substantive due
process claims); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“Because
the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must
be the guide for analyzing these claims.”).
212. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing criticisms of
Graham doctrine).
213. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the justification
for application of the Graham doctrine). But see Borgmann, The
Constitutionality, supra note 33, at 51–52 (pointing out that the Court has often
applied Graham only to reject the more “textually explicit” claim on the merits,
raising the question of how a litigant is to know that this provision even
“applies” to her case).
215. Supra notes 23–36 and accompanying text.
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justify allowing a substantive due process claim to preempt any
other constitutional claim. In an about-face from Graham, undue
burden preemption has been applied to allow an unenumerated,
substantive due process right—the right to abortion—to displace
the textually explicit rights of equal protection and freedom of
speech. As to bodily integrity, which is also unenumerated, there
is still no reason one can draw from Graham for concluding that
one substantive due process right preempts another. Second, in
the cases in which courts have applied undue burden preemption,
the preempted claims were not interchangeable with undue
burden claims. As discussed above, each raised distinct concerns
having nothing to do with whether a woman could access
abortion.216 Thus, under the sole exception to the prevailing
approach, undue burden preemption is still indefensible.
V. Conclusion
Abortion has been wrongly subjected to special, disfavored
treatment in many areas of the law. Most obviously, in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme
Court jettisoned strict scrutiny for a new constitutional test,
custom made for abortion restrictions. This test opened the door
for state legislatures’ exceptional treatment of abortion, as they
have piled on restrictions not applied to other medical
procedures. Undue burden preemption, however, goes a step
beyond this by interpreting the undue burden standard as
preempting wholly unrelated constitutional claims. It thus
effectively eliminates valid claims against abortion restrictions
that are not about access—the issue for which the undue burden
standard was clearly designed.
In other contexts, courts analyze separate constitutional
rights claims individually, under the respective rules applicable
to each claim. The only recognized exception to this rule—the
Graham doctrine—further casts doubt on the legitimacy of undue
burden exceptionalism. Under the Graham doctrine, courts
displace substantive due process claims when a more specific
constitutional provision also applies. In these cases, both claims
216.

Supra Part III.
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are essentially duplicative, and the court eschews the doctrinal
approach
considered
more
amorphous
and
judicially
precarious. Undue burden preemption turns this concept upside
down. Courts abandon well-established tests—even under
textually explicit provisions such as the First Amendment or the
Equal Protection Clause—for the infamously nebulous undue
burden standard. Undue burden preemption cannot be explained
as anything other than a bald attempt to limit the constitutional
avenues claimants may use to challenge abortion restrictions. It
will be up to the Supreme Court to recognize and stop this trend.

